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Thesis

THE INTER-DEPENDENCE OF BOWNE'S ETHICS AND METAPHYSICS AS SHOWN IN HIS PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

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THE INTER-DEPENDENCE OF BOWNE'S ETHICS AND METAPHYSICS AS SHOWN IN HIS PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

PART I

METAPHYSICS

Introduction

This thesis is an attempt to do three things:

(1) to briefly give the essential elements in Bowne's Ethics and Metaphysics;

(2) to show for the most part that his ethics depends on his metaphysics;

(3) and that both ethics and metaphysics are incomplete until they are concluded in the philosophy of religion.

ONTOLOGY
Definitions

The definitions of our important terms come first. Metaphysics asks the question, What is reality?

What is metaphysics?

Leighton used the words "metaphysics" and "philosophy" as synonyms. But since metaphysics is a branch of philosophy, Leighton is not correct in calling metaphysics by the more inclusive title, "philosophy". The nature of these immanent principles will be made apparent after the other terms are defined.

What is ethics? Bowne says that "Ethics aims to find and formulate the principles which underlie practice in order that we may better understand and guide our lives". (2) He recognizes in ethics several distinct ~~several distinct~~ factors, a set of aims to be realized; a set of formal judgments concerning right and wrong; and a set of commands to be obeyed. (3) These three factors are made central in the analysis of Christian ethics by MacKenzie, who, like Bowne, is in agreement with Schleiermacher. (4) Brightman defines ethics as "the normative science of morals or conduct". (5) Everett calls it the "science of values in their relation to the conduct of life as a whole". (6) Ethics, is the attempt to answer the question, "What ought I to do?"

What is personalism? The definition of personalism is not unanimously fixed by the followers of personalism. Dean Knudson takes seventy pages in "The Philosophy of Personalism" to tell what personalism means. Bowne called part of his own system "transcendental empiricism". (7) Since the outer world has only phenomenal reality he says "phenomenalism" would describe his position. The world of objective experience is a thought world which has no meaning or reality apart from intelligence; hence, "objective idealism" is an appropriate designation for Bowne's system. (8) Bowne means by "transcendentalism" and "empiricism", that we cannot test "our fundamental experience by the categories", but must "find the meaning of the categories in experience". (9) But this experience, Bowne teaches, "is not

the passive experience of sense, but the active self-experience of intelligence". (10) Since Bowne believed that living, acting intelligence is the source of all truth and reality, it is correct to call his system "personalism", although he did not popularize the term himself. His students and friends have made much more of the word than he did. Dr. Brightman says that personalism is "the theory that to be is to be a self or a member of a self". (11) It is permissible to use the words "self" and "soul" interchangeably, for the soul is "the living self". (12)

What is the self?

The soul is "the self that thinks and feels and wills, and in this activity experiences and knows itself as the active and abiding subject of this inner life". (13) With this background, the final definition of personality is clearer. Personality is "self-consciousness, self-knowledge, and self-control". (14) This is possible in the fullest sense only to the infinite. Dr. Brightman has developed this thought further in defining a person as "a self capable of attaining sufficient unity to create values". (15)

THE METAPHYSICS OF BOWNE

Aim and field of metaphysics

With the ground somewhat cleared by these definitions, we are free to continue. The first distinction that must be made is that between phenomenal and ontological reality. The latter is the field of metaphysics, while the former is the field of experience. It is the work of science to discover the necessary connections in the realm of phenomenal reality, while it is the work of metaphysics to formulate the theory of ultimate reality. Thus metaphysics includes science and

interprets science, but goes beyond science to the fundamental categories that make being intelligible.

The notion of being

We will study Bowne's ethics and metaphysics before showing their interrelations. His metaphysics begins with "the notion of being". It is certain that there is "being". Bowne rejects the common-sense notion that "the mark of being is to be found pre-eminently in sense-phenomena". (16) Neither is he satisfied to define being as that which can be perceived. The distinctive mark of being is in some power of action. (17) Things exist whether they are perceived or not because, though not perceived, they are in interaction with one another. Since the phenomenal world manifests incessant change and motion, he adds to the phenomena the notion of an agent which causes them. He demands that being contain in itself the ground and the explanation of what exists. Being, then, is viewed as definite, as active, and as causal. He distinguishes between phenomenal and ontological reality. Matter is the phenomenal product of a dynamic within it.

The phenomenality of matter or phenomenal and ontological reality

In this underlying reality, all is activity. All things are in continuous interaction. The seeming inaction of matter is an illusion. This is a principle of physics as well as of metaphysics.

Pure being is an abstraction

Bowne, like Hegel, holds ~~that on the point~~ that "pure being is an abstraction". Hegel

begins with pure being. But we may begin our dialectic anywhere in his system and arrive at the same conclusion. Hegel says that "being and nothing are the most abstract, the poorest, and therefore the initial forms of opposition". (18) "The advance from the abstract to the concrete is shown to be The Idea driving itself forth and developing itself from itself". (19) And again Hegel says, "My view is that The Idea must be grasped and expressed only as process in itself; (e.g., as becoming) as movement; for the true is not a mere resting, a being, but only as self-moving, as alive...." (20)

From this presentation, it would appear that Hegel and Bowne agree on pure being as an abstraction. Hegel starts with pure being and proceeds to something more definite. It would seem fair to Hegel to say that while Bowne was not Hegelian, he was influenced by Hegel. Bowne rejects pure being in these words, "The notion of pure being is rejected, (1) as being only a logical concept, and, as such, incapable of real existence; and, (2) as inadequate to the functions it has to perform. There is no progress from it to definite being, and there is no regress from definite being to it". (21) In this respect, Bowne and Hegel are agreed, even if Hegel's dialectic does not clearly show how we arrive from "pure being" and "nothing" to "becoming" and finally"The Idea" itself. Bowne and Hegel agree also on the necessity of action as allied to being.

"Being and action are inseparable". (22)

The net result

Bowne rejects the crude sense-metaphysics which sees reality in that which can be pictures and grasped by the senses. Phenomenal reality must not be taken as final reality. Ontological reality is not a problem for the senses but rather a problem for thought. Within the "lumps of matter" we must see a dynamic energy, which is the real nature of being. We have not yet shown the differences between phenomenal and ontological reality. When we shall have considered the nature of the world-ground, these differences will become clearer.

THE NATURE OF THINGS

Definition of "the nature of things"

The second of our metaphysical considerations is called "the nature of things". The nature of a thing is the real essence of that thing, the inner principle by which a thing is what it is. (23) This real nature cannot be found in sense-qualities.

Nature not in sense-qualities

The Nature of things cannot be shown to us through the senses. The rejection of a crude sense criterion may lead to agnosticism, if not to the denial of quality to being. Or, again, it may lead to an uncritical intuitional view, or a knowledge of the

unseen by a kind of occult power that abandons reason entirely. If we allow that we cannot determine the qualities of being, we are in agreement with Herbert and other agnostics. If we allow being, but deny qualities to being, we are back to "pure being" again that we thought we had disposed of some time ago. It must be denied, also, that Bowne in his earlier views held that intuition could reveal the nature of

Two views criticised

a thing. "The outcome of the previous argument is, that no intuition or action of the receptivity can reveal the nature of a thing. This nature must forever remain supersensible, and its determination must always be a problem of reason, not of sense". (24) In a letter to Dr. Cell, Bowne seems to differ with himself on this point. "Any knowledge of reality must finally rest on some important intuition of which no further account may be given." (25) Can these be harmonized? I believe that Bowne meant in the first instance that we cannot grasp reality by looking at it. Bowne would not change this view even in the "epoch of his maturity". There is no essential contradiction in the two statements insofar as reason and intuition are both supersensible from the standpoint of crude sense-experience.

Final view of "the nature of things"

The conclusion of Bowne's position on "the nature of things" is that "law or principle" determines the form and character of a thing's activity. (26)

The attempt to think of a thing as a quality has failed, and Bowne concludes that we must think of thing as a law of activity. I believe there is dissatisfaction in the thought of being as law, but being without law is nothing. (27) To know the law which makes the differences in things, "is to know the thing in itself, or in its inmost essence".(28) We have not yet developed the notion of being sufficiently "to say whether the physical elements fill out the notion of being". (29)

CHANGE AND IDENTITY

Definition of Change

Neither science nor philosophy defines change as "a lawless and groundless sequence". (30) A causal continuity is assumed by science and philosophy "between the successive states of reality whereby each is founded in its predecessor, and, in turn, founds its successor". (31) The positivistic position of antecedence and sequence, as the only relation between past and future, is excluded. (32) The latter view would reduce everything to a groundless becoming in which the present would not be founded in the past, and would not found the future. There would be no continuity. "The past founded the present, and the present founds the future, but everywhere there are ground and law". (33) In the doctrine of becoming, the process alone is permanent. (34) The forms of the process, which we call things, are forever coming and going. "The fact that one indivisible flow divides itself for our thought

into two factors--a ceasing and a becoming-- involves no more contradiction than the fact that the same curve is both concave and convex when seen from opposite sides". (35) When we look upon the problem of change and identity in this light, Bowne asks once more if they can be reconciled.

Refutation of the impersonal view

Bowne concludes that absolute changelessness is impossible in impersonal reality. He is forced to give up the current notion of a thing as a changeless substance with changing states. According to the popular understanding of the conservation of energy, when a thing changes its phase, that thing becomes something new. But when a new phase appears, the old vanishes into the new. So a thing viewed ontologically is the same thing throughout its phases, and when it produces a new phase, it has vanished into its effect; i.e., the cause disappears into the effect. Yet this notion of phases is largely arbitrary, for time is not composed of moments but is continuous. Being is perpetual process, and motion and change are always present. This whole discussion seems rather paradoxical, and will remain so as long as we conceive of a world of things existing apart from intelligence. (36)

Categories must be understood through intelligence

The successive phases of things must be linked together by some law-giving idea of God. It is not clear how the idea can take on temporal form. We do not get out of this difficulty without giving the underlying idea intelligence and energy. This something, called "idea", is abiding and enables us to escape the eternal flow. Fortunately, we have this "something" revealed in our own experience. "In personality, or in the self-conscious spirit, we find the only union of change and permanence, or of identity and diversity". (37) The self knows itself to be the same in spite of the constant flow of experience. "Only the personal truly is". (38)

The charge of anthropomorphism

Here, in the importance given by Bowne to the self and self-consciousness, we find that he and Hegel parallel each other again in their thinking. ".... The self-conscious knower is treated by Hegel as the ultimate fact, towhich all other facts--if we may even speak of them provisionally as independent facts --are relative, and in which they find their explanation". (39) If self-consciousness is the highest fact we know, then we are justified in using the conception of self-consciousness as our best key to the

ultimate nature" of reality, or "of existence as a whole". Since Hegel uses as his datum the human self-consciousness, and since Bowne uses "experience", it would seem that they are not far apart in the bases upon which they build their systems. At any rate, we are not illogical, if we interpret the lower in terms of the higher. The charge of anthropomorphism is not a valid one.

Bowne's final view of "change and identity"

Intelligence cannot be understood through its own categories, but "the categories must be understood through our experience of intelligence itself". (40) This means, that instead of viewing ontology as the interpreter of personality, Bowne takes personality as the interpreter of ontology. "Only personality is able to give concrete meaning to those ontologival categories by which we seek to interpret being". (41) He sees that we must have identity, and that we must recognize change, but that they cannot be reconciled on the impersonal plane, for as abstract principles they are in mutual contradiction, and will remain so until they are unified in the changing substance of the self-conscious thinker. (42)

CAUSALITY

Definition of Causality

As a formal category, the idea of causality is simple and admits of no definition. But we need to decide the form in which the concrete category must be conceived. (43) Aristotle found four causes in the processes of change or becoming: "(1) the formal cause: the form or conception of that which is to be, as it exists ideally, either in the essential nature of things themselves or in the mind, - for example, the plan of a house in the mind of the builder; (2) the material cause: that which is to be wrought to this form, - as the brick, timber, etc. of which the house is to be constructed; (3) the efficient, or moving, cause, - as the actual labor expended in building; (4) the final cause: that which is the end or object of the process, - as the completed house". *

"Every scientific conception of the causality of the system assumes that similar causes must have similar effects, and that there is some fixed quantitative and qualitative relation between the cause and the effect". (44) Resident in things there is an all-embracing harmony which enables us to depend upon their acting in certain ways under certain conditions.

* W. T. Harris, Webster's New International Dictionary, Springfield, Mass.: G. & C. Merriam Co., 1930 p.351.

Need of a "system"

If our universe is at all intelligible, it must be a system. This unified oneness seems to be a related whole. We are surrounded by, and are a part of ,a system of "law and order". But there can be no unity without interaction of the many, and there is no possibility of the interaction of the many, without the unity of the all-embracing once.

Unity is essential

We must have unity in our world system. That unity is the experience of our own intellect. We must think of causation as dynamic determination. (45) Bowne described causes in terms of the effects. Effects come from causes only by including them in the notion of being. (46)

Final view of causality

Bowne's view of causality brings us again to the statement that the metaphysical categories elude our apprehension until we put them in terms of personal experience. (47) We seek in vain for any unity in impersonal causality that is satisfactory. "Volitional causality..... is the only conception of metaphysical causality in which we can rest". (48)

The laws of sequence and change may be studied under the name of causation, provided we understand that this is not causation at all. But for efficient causation, final causation, there must be either volitional causality or nothing. (49) If we are to escape the infinite regress, which wrecks reason on the problem of error, "this volitional causality must be viewed as self-determining or free". (50) "Unity, identity, and causality are possible only through free intelligence. Truth itself is possible only through free intelligence... What we call the interaction of the many is possible only through the immanent action of the one fundamental reality". (51)

THE WORLD-GROUND

Relation of the finite to the infinite

The fundamental and independent being which we call the infinite, or the absolute, is the world-ground. It is the self-sufficient source of the finite. It is not externally restricted and determined, but is the basal causality by which the world is produced and maintained. All things have their cause and reason in this being. To explain the universe, the infinite must be both causal and active. The danger of such immanence is pantheism. When we understand Bowne's transcendentalism, his immanence doctrine is not pan-

theistic. To stop with immanence is to lay personalism open to the charge of pantheism. Bowne holds to a transcendental immanence that goes beyond the world of appearances. While the infinite embraces all things, it must embrace them as what they are. The finite has individuality and personality which are inalienable. * If we sweep everything into one conception of "Thought" or "Consciousness", we are the victims of the "fallacy of the universal". (53)

Relation of infinite to the finite

Since the infinite is the world-ground, it must be viewed as the primal source of all finite existence. The finite has no ground of being in itself, and hence its nature and relations must have been originally determined by the infinite. Hence, the finite is the result of a plan or purpose of the infinite. Leaving freedom out for the moment, every finite thing is what it is and where it is and when it is, because of the plan of existence. (54) Both theism and atheism regard the finite as dependent on the world-ground. Theism calls the order of dependence a plan, while atheism calls it "the nature of the infinite". In both cases this plan or purpose is the determining principle of all finite existence. "All speculators alike, then, must pass behind the finite and find the conditioning principle of the finite to the infinite". (55)

* This is not an excerpt.

Final view of "world-ground"

Bowne's final view is a basal monism which applies to principles as well as to things. Intelligence is the key to reality as well as the sould of the categories. In affirming that God is personal, Bowne means that the infinite knows and determines himself and his activities. This does not mean that God's consciousness is the same as ours. "The essential meaning of intelligence is the power to know", and the essential "meaning of personality" is "self-consciousness, self-knowledge, and self-control". (14)

COSMOLOGY

SPACE

Space and coherence

We come now to the second division of Bowne's metaphysics - his cosmology. Space and time are not so important for this thesis as his other categories, and hence will not be treated in detail. Under space, we consider what its true metaphysical nature is, and how it is related to the things which are said to be in it.(56) It is essential that we have a unified system of thought but in the real space, apart from mind, there is no unity possible if space is viewed as real. According to Bowne's theory, "space is neither a real thing nor an ontological predicate". (57) The phenominal reality of space is evident, and no one thinks of denying it. Our doubt concerns only the ontological reality of space. The world of our experience is spatial. We are

Space is phenomenal

not in a world of illusions. Ultimately, space must be an intuition and a mode of appearance. We cannot affirm space of the infinite. (58)

TIME

Ideality of time

"As a whole, time does not exist, and substantive reality is not in time any more than it is in space". (59)

This is the essential conclusion of Bowne. There is no independent time in which change occurs and by which we can measure change. Change i s first, and time is but the form of that change. Only by construing time from the standpoint of self-conscious intelligence, instead of from extra-mental existence, do we escape the contradictions and impossibilities of the traditional and idealistic views of time. We must look into experience to explain time. Time is a "thought relation which has neither existence nor meaning apart from thought". (60) Since thought is the source of temporal

Self-consciousness and time

relations, we must fall back upon experience to explain time. Time becomes, instead of an ontological fact, a function of self-conscious intelligence.

MATTER, FORCE, AND MOTION

The phenomenality of matter

Matter, as well as space and time, is phenomenal. This does not mean that matter is illusory or fictitious, for we know it is a real part of

objective and universal experience. As phenomenal reality, both time and matter have their laws. To a person on the sense plane, matter offers no metaphysical problem. There is no mystery, for everything is visible. Only when a person begins to reflect does he encounter obstacles to the common-sense view.

The atomistic theory

Many theories are advanced to give matter ontological existence, chief among which is the atomic theory. But even the atoms which modern science calls for are not mutually independent and indifferent. They are parts of a whole. If there can be force without matter, then matter can no longer be supreme.(61)

Final conclusion on matter, force and motion

Bowne concludes that "the material world is not compounded of atoms and their forces, but is rather a product of one infinite, omnipresent, eternal energy by which it is continually supported, and from which it incessantly proceeds". (62) We must remember that the atomic theory is only a theory, and that it does not conflict with metaphysics unless the atoms are thought of as ontological reality and as the ultimate causal ground.

NATURE

Nature as matter and force

We have already answered the question "What is nature?" when nature is thought of as phenomenon. It is impossible to consider nature as matter and as force. The

The assigning of law to nature does not mean that nature is a self-running mechanism. To give law power without there being a law-giver is an admission of unclear thinking. There is a difference between inductive and productive causality. The laws of nature are not final cause. (63) Thus the definition of physical nature becomes the following: nature is the sum-total and system of phenomena which are subject to law. (64) The mastery of phenomenal laws does not give us the causal connection of things. Nature is a superficial name when applied to the mystery of causation. It is an error to think of the "laws of nature" as a circle of unbreakable, impersonal forces. While we live under a system of law, it is not a "closed system". (65)

Evolution There is much confusion in the popular mind concerning the theory of evolution. "Evolution may be either a cosmic formula or a biological doctrine". (66) If we take evolution as a description of the development and phenomenal origin of things, it is a good description and a valid theory. But of course we cannot make evolution into a theory of causation, without confusing our logical and metaphysical thinking. "Considered in itself, nature is simply a form of working for the expression and realization of a thought or plan". (67) That plan is the result of the Living Will which worketh hitherto, worketh now, and worketh evermore.

Nature is thoroughly explained only by making it the expression of the immanent God, who supports this phenomenal fabric we call "the world" by his living Presence.

Nature and supernatural

There is no more important consideration for religion than the metaphysical distinction between natural and supernatural. The validity of prayer, the freedom of God, the freedom of the individual, and the validity of reason are all vitally affected by this differentiation. If there is no freedom, reason founders on the fact or error. Bowne's position is made emphatic here. "A natural event is one which occurs is an order in an order of law". (68) "....Mechanism is a sheer fiction. Nature is God's continuous deed; and natural laws are only his uniform ways of working". (69) The mistake commonly made is that of thinking that all that can be rescued from a "supernatural cause" is made purposeless. Thus if we assign an event to a "natural cause", that events lack purpose. (70) The conclusion does not follow, however, unless we allow that nature is essentially blind, mechanical, and self-existent. But if nature be intelligent, then all the believer cares to show is that the natural products are intended no matter how they are realized. The believer in purpose maintains that the divine purpose is present whether the event occurs "naturally" or by divine

fiat. (71) "But if it should turn out that the cause behind the law is essentially personal and purposive, and that the system of law represents only the general form of this free causality, there would be no difficulty in holding that events in general are, at once, natural in the mode of their occurrence and supernatural in their causation. The natural would be the mode of manifestation of the supernatural, and the supernatural would be the real ground and administrator of the natural". (72) As far as the religious interest goes, the question is one of intended or unintended. (73) Thus the supernatural is not something foreign to nature, but rather is the ever-present ground and the administrator of the natural. The commonest event is as supernatural as the strongest miracle, for God is implicated in both. (74)

Miracles

It is rather difficult to define miracle because of the confusion in philosophical thought as to what constitutes a miracle. According to Bowne, what is commonly regarded as a miracle is not more so than theevents we take for granted every day. The law is the important consideration even though God is not found in the law. (75)

God's immanence

We have shown somewhat the view that Bowne holds as to the immanence of God in nature. It needs more emphasis. "Nature

is no independent something dividing the empire of the world with God, but it is throughout subject to the divine will and purpose, and is at bottom simply the form which that purpose takes on as realized by that will. God, then, is immanent in the world". (76) "If the finite wishes to act upon God, say by prayer, neither the prayer nor the person need go wandering about to reach and find God; for we live and have our being in him; and he is an ever-present power in us". (77) Thus we make nature entirely dependent upon God and the direct manifestation of his will.

PSYCHOLOGY

The soul

So far, we have been dealing with the general metaphysical categories. Now we come to the world of mind. The central point in Bowne's psychology is the soul or the self. It seems that the soul has received rather harsh treatment at the hands of materialism and behaviorism. This is due to a misunderstanding of what is meant by the soul. Materialism says that the soul is substantially nothing. The various states of consciousness account for what used to be called the soul. These states are produced by the physical organism. Bowne says the physical can not produce the mental. Thought cannot be viewed under the microscope, nor is it composed of a grouping of the elements.

The soul "is the self that thinks and feels and wills, and in this activity experiences and knows itself as the active and abiding subject of this inner life. It is not something which can be sensuously presented; it is what we all experience as ourselves". (78) When we say that the soul is real, we mean that it acts and is capable of being acted upon. (79) "The reality of the soul consists in its ability to act; other reality it has none". (80) Thus since we make the soul the living self, we have no doubt about its existence.

The Mind-body problem

With the reality of the soul made apparent, the problem of the relationship between the mind and the body appears. The word "mind" may be used interchangeably with the word "soul" if we mean by mind more than brain. Mind is self-consciousness. Briefly, Bowne holds that the mind and the body are in interaction with each other. "Dependence may be understood in the sense of causal production by the organism and it may mean an order of concomitant variation in the physical and the mental series. In the former sense the mental life is not dependent on the organism. In the latter sense there is mutual dependence of each on the other. There are mental states arising in connection with organic states; and there are organic states arising in connection

with mental states. In this sense the causality works both ways". * An absolute mental life would need no organism. "....The finite spirit, in so far as it is in interaction with other spirits and with the cosmic system, must always need some fixed system for receiving and giving impulses; otherwise it would not be in the world at all". * It is conceivable that under other conditions the mind might go on without the present organism. Each is adjusted to the other in accordance with the plan of the system we live under. (81) We know that the physical and the mental mutually affect each other, but it would be a poor piece of metaphysics to say that the body can explain the mind in terms of physical causation.

The origin of souls

Materialism has been rejected as an explanation of causality. Matter does not have the power to originate souls. The view Bowne adopts is "that where and when the divine plan, which is the law of cosmic activity" calls for the creation of a soul, "there and then a soul begins its existence and development". (82) "It is not the outcome of its finite antecedents, but is a new beginning...." * No answer to the problem of the soul's origin is complete which omits God as the essential causality in the making of souls.

* Bowne, Metaphysics, p.374.

The future of souls

Metaphysics cannot say much that is positive about the preservation of souls. But we can say that the destruction of the body does not necessarily mean the destruction of the soul, since we do not make the body the causal ground of the soul. God gave the soul life, and if he pleases he will maintain it. (83) While we say that moral values are eternally significant values, we cannot build too much hope upon speculation alone. At least, it is reasonable to believe that immortality is possible.

FREEDOM AND NECESSITY

Definition of freedom

One of Bowne's constant endeavors is to show that mechanism is purely phenomenal. If in the study of life we find it necessary to assume, in connection with law, an element of choice and self-direction, freedom should not appear more strange than the assumption we make of an all-embracing uniformity of law in the physical world. "By freedom in our human life we mean the power of self-direction, the power to form plans, purposes, ideals, and to work for their realization". "Abstract freedom exists as little as abstract necessity". (84) In a world-scheme of necessity, error becomes necessary and reason is overwhelmed in the ensuing scepticism. It is because of this fact that freedom concerns logic and metaphysics more than it does ethics. This closer relationship of freedom to logic is true for

the purest type of freedom but not for the importance of the questions involved. The important field for freedom is that of ethics. (85) Bowne says that we need freedom for the Absolute quite as much as we need it for the finite. "An absolute freedom, unconditioned by any law whatever, is simply our old friend pure being". "We must affirm a fixed nature as the conditioned of freedom". (86) Yet awhile there is a steady nature to the infinite, freedom assumes that the system is not self-running, and therefore not a "closed system" of law which cannot be altered by the Divine Will.

Summary of first section of thesis

We have completed the study of the essential categories and find that Bowne has made the following valid conclusions from his metaphysics:

(1) Experience is the ground upon which the categories are built.

(2) The categories do not explain the mind, but the mind construes the categories.

(3) Matter is phenomenal, but mind is ontological.

(4) Ultimate reality is a unified, active, causal, volitional, intelligent, personal Creator.

(5) Both the infinite and the finite have "freedom".

The next section of the thesis will deal with the ethics of Bowne and its relationship to his metaphysics.

PART II

ETHICS

ETHICS
Aim of ethics

Two of the leading thoughts in Bowne's ethical system are: (1) the necessity of uniting the intuitive and the experience schools in order to reach a working system; and, (2) that the aim of conduct is not abstract virtue, but the fulness and richness of life. (87) "A complete ethics must consider the whole man and the whole field of life". (88) Thus ethics must understand the principles which underlie our lives if it is to be a correct and valid guide. The principles laid down for conduct must take account of things as they are, while pointing to things as they ought to be.

The beginning of ethics

The beginning of ethics belongs to that period of our human history known as the pre-historic. But the question is not when ethics began or how it began. These are psychological and historical questions of factual importance but little moral worth. A simple beginning of ethics will not undermine the imperative quality of its principles. (89) The validity of ethics must come from a study of the inner laws of the consciousness, as well as a knowledge of the practical ef-

fects of conduct. By such a search we attain sure ground. We are building our structure on experience, even as we did with the important principles of metaphysics. "Man did not begin by inquiring into the implications of ethical existence and by settling all the metaphysical difficulties involved in them, but he began by being ethical and by implicitly assuming all that is implied therein. He did not prove that he had a right to be ethical, but he found himself such. He did not resolve the metaphysical puzzles in the notion of freedom, but he found himself compelled to regard himself and his fellows as responsible, and hence as free". (90)

Is ethics dependent on metaphysics?

For the most part, the ethics of Bowne is dependent on his metaphysics. Both systems are built on experience, however. At times, Bowne rather despairs of finding any help in metaphysics. This is true, at least, for an absolute system of ethics. "The metaphysical attributes of the world-ground are ethically barren. They furnish the possibility of an ethical nature, but they do not imply it as a necessity". (91) We must resort to "faith in our ideal of the perfect being" or "appeal to experience to prove that the world-ground proceeds according to ethical principles". (92) Here we see as clearly as possible how Bowne believes that the intuitive and experience schools should be united in our ethical theory. Again, he says, "Our formal judgments of right and wrong have no direct dependence upon theistic faith. It is at this point

that the moral argument has been most mismanaged. How can the obligation of justice, truth, benevolence, gratitude, be made to depend even on the existence of God?... These are absolute moral intuitions". (93)

Bowne agrees with Sorley

There is much in common between the ethical systems of Bowne and Sorley. The latter rejects metaphysical ethics that are built without the aid of moral experience. "The fault which is to be found with metaphysical ethics is, in the end, just this, that is data are insufficient. It tends to disregard that portion of experience which is of greatest importance for its purpose; namely, moral experience. It bases ethics upon metaphysics, and metaphysics is an interpretation of experience, but it starts from a limited view of experience, and tries to pass to ethical concepts without taking into account those factors in experience which are relevant to the later inquiry, though they may not have been required for the earlier stages". (94) This is such a cogent statement of Bowne's thinking that I wish it might be credited to Bowne rather than to Sorley. Bowne does not discount metaphysics entirely, however, for on closer inspection the categories of metaphysics are found necessary. "Ethics begins independently, but must finally be affected by our metaphysics. Speculation does not have the function of generating our moral judgments, but of adjusting them to our total intellectual system. In this adjustment, the dependence of ethics on metaphysics appears. The connection is the same as in the theory

of knowledge". (95) It is in the category of purpose that ethics receives confirmation from metaphysics. "This is the explanation by intelligence which is supposed to be moving towards preconceived ends, so that the activity is not merely driven from behind, but looks before to some end to be reached, and with reference to which the whole is determined. And this explanation takes up all lower forms into itself. From the orderly nature of mind we should expect an order of law, not as a dumb fact, but as expressing at once the orderly natureof intelligence and the way in which it realizes its aims. From the mental demand for unity and continuity we should also expect to find all things and events forming a system in which everything conditions every other thing, and in which each new state of things grows out of a past state of things. Explanation by intelligence, too, is the only one which ever comes to an end. In any mechanical system we not only reach no simpler state of things, but are shut up to an infinite regress in which thought itself perishes. An ultimate ground of things in which to rest can be found only in free intelligence. This is the only simplicity which can originate complexity; the only unity which can produce plurality; the only universal which can specify itself into particulars; the only real explanation of anything". (96)

I have repeated the above quotation at length, with the danger of some repetition, because it

is one of the best summaries in Bowne's works pointing directly to the "coherence" criterion of truth.

The coherence criterion

While Bowne does not use the word "coherence" in the final classification of his system, he might well have done so, for it is the test he constantly uses.

The ethical use of unity

In no better way can we show the interrelationship of Bowne's ethics and metaphysics than to go through the essential categories we have been describing and point out their significance from the ethical standpoint. When we have logically demonstrated that the fundamental world-ground is one and not many, we have taken the first step toward an intelligent system of things. There can be no system without unity. The ethical principles of man are a part of this unitary system and as such must find their explanation within the system. So far does the metaphysical category of unity carry us; it is not much, but it is something. We shall consider the other categories in their bearing upon ethics after we more clearly understand what Bowne's ethical principles are.

Fundamental Moral Ideas and their order

The Good, Duty, and Virtue are the fundamental moral ideas, and are alike necessary. In the ancient systems of ethics, the idea of the good was fundamental. There was much difference of opinion as to what was the good. Some found

it in pleasure; others in an indifference to pleasure; still others in happiness. The general scheme might be called "the goods ethics", or "the happiness ethics".

Definition of goods ethics

A definition of this important school of ethical thought follows: "All forms of goods ethics agree in finding the reason and obligation of action in the end, conceived as a good, to which action is directed". (97) This is utilitarianism and as a system of prudence and shrewdness it falls beneath the moral plane altogether.

Duty ethics

To the statement that certain principles of conduct should rule our actions, everyone agrees who has any moral insight worth considering. Justice, good-will, truthfulness are qualities which stand in their own right without any support other than their imperative qualities. "So far from deducing the idea of duty from the notion of the good, we have to determine the content of the good in accordance with our conception of duty. This general view may be called the duty ethics". (98) Here we have the shadow of Kant falling upon the thought of Bowne; morality is a "Categorical imperative". It is clear that the duty ethics are nearer the facts of the moral life than the goods ethics are. To have an adequate theory of conduct, we

must account for both theories. Duty ethics alone tend to formalism, while goods ethics alone tend to shrewdness. Neither school is adopted by Bowne to the exclusion of the other.

Reconciliation of goods ethics and duty ethics

No ethics, continues Bowne, can be formally right which ignores results. ".....The great bulk of duty refers to some form of productive activity; and here the only assignable rational ground of obligation lies in its relation to well-being". (100) And yet in action that is to be moral, we demand more than a consideration of results. The motive must be considered apart from the material consequences. Right action may, or may not, have external success and yet have a pure ethical motive.

The motive of action

There is grave danger of running into an ethics of intentions with the duty school emphasis upon right motive. Hell is paved with many a good "duty ethicist". I am not sure that Bowne is clear when he says that "the morality of the person depends on his motives, but the morality of a code depends on its consequences". (101) He does not mean that, for he goes on to show that the good will alone is not enough. The good will can exist only as there are natural goods concerning which the good will wills something. It must will a choice

or realization. There is a law of well-being as well as a law of form. When a conflict occurs, the law of well-being takes precedence. (102) It is in the apparent indifference, and even the opposition at times of these two laws, which gives rise to duty ethics and good ethics. The two must be combined before we can reach any complete moral system. It is claimed that a thing should be done solely because it is right. Good ethics and duty ethics imply and supplement each other.

Conclusion on reconciliation of duty and goods ethics

Bowne accepts Schleiermacher's position that the good, duty, and virtue are the fundamental moral ideas and that their order is that just given. "There must be goods of some sort to give duty any rational meaning; and the free and loving performance of duty is what we mean by virtue". (103) "When these goods are seen in their value and obligation, and the free spirit devotes itself to their realization, we have moral activity". (104) "No conduct can be even formally right when the agent does not aim to be materially right. The ideal of conduct demands both formal and material rightness". (105) A man must do more than the best he knows to be right, for he must be in harmony with reality and its laws. Which, if we must choose, does Bowne

finally make the more important? "Formal rightness, of course, is ethically the more important, as it involves the good will; but material rightness is only less important, as without it our action is out of harmony with the universe". (106) "Consequences are the criteria of material rightness; but to the agent belongs the duty and the merit of its realization". (107) Thus Bowne is Kantian in his ethics, even though he attempts a reconciliation of the duty and the goods ethics. In the ideal, however, the two are harmonized.

What is the good?

Our abstract ethics will do us no good unless we can determine what the good is. Some would say that the good is that which is desirable. We are told to watch life and see what men desire. But the moral problem is not so simple as that. Men desire things which they ought not to desire. (108) Some try to find the good in pleasure. By comparing various objects in units of pleasure, we are supposed to be able to find the highest good. (109) The view that is called "deterministic hedonism" is rejected, for it results in necessitarianism and mechanism instead of morality. Ethics is left out entirely; freedom alone can change mechanism to morality. The facts of life show that we are self-conscious beings able to modify the mechanical and passive consciousness. We have desire not only in the passive sensibility, but also in self-consciousness. (110) While no school ever proposed unhappi-

ness as the end of ethics, we are not helped much by being told to seek happiness. We ask the question, "In what conditions may happiness be found?" Bowne advances, as the definition of the ideal good, the following: "The ideal good is conscious life in the full development of all its normal possibilities; and the actual good is greater or less as this ideal is more or less approximated". (111) From this we see that Bowne is somewhat of a perfectionist in his ethics. We may develop an ideal life only in an ideal environment, but an ideal character may be developed without the perfect external conditions.

The good will and its environment

While Bowne says that the good will is very important, it needs a field for its development which it does not create, but finds. (112) That field is the potentiality of our nature, which, in turn, is dependent on a developed social order and the co-working of the physical world. "The good will cannot get far unless it finds itself in a system which is adjusted to, and supplements, its efforts. This is the ground of Kant's argument for a world power which makes for righteousness and unites virtue and happiness in the supreme good". (113) Since

I believe nothing can out-rank a morality whose aim is the attainment of the largest and fullest life, and since that life would be both the most perfect and the happiest, the supreme good is the combination of perfection and happiness. But our moral life is found to be adjusted to the total system of the universe from the angle of perfection more than from that of happiness. Society puts a deeper value upon the life of "worth" than it does upon the life of superficial happiness. By worth, I mean the life devoted to the production of moral character, rather than to the passive enjoyment of life as it is found.

Need of a subjective standard

Our moral task as individuals, and as a society, is to develop this life into its ideal form. But it is impossible to find what this moral ideal is from the observation of the world or of life, "....We have to fall back on some form of moral insight" (114) This does not mean that any individual standard is right. There would be no law if there was no standard. Individualism of the reckless kind, which ignores reason and consequences, has never been held by any one whose opinion was worth considering. It is accidental that the goods ethics has been allied to the selfish psychology. This ethics simply holds that the obligating ground of action must be in the good to which it is directed. This is valid no matter what our psychology may be. The question is "Can we completely determine our judgments of right and wrong by what we know or anticipate of consequences,

or must we also have recourse to some inner standard by which consequences must be judged?" (115)

Spencer's "Rational Utilitarianism

If we retain the selfish theory of desire, there is no progress in our ethical theory. But if we give it up entirely, we are also in difficulty. It is doubtful if the general is true, if the particular is not provided for. Trying each case on its own merits is difficult, for we do not know all the consequences. Spencer's "rational utiltarianism" says, it is "the business of Moral Science to deduce from the laws of life and the conditions of existence what kinds of action necessarily tend to produce happiness, and what kinds to produce unhappiness. Having done this, its deductions are to be recognized as laws of conduct, and are to be conformed to, irrespective of a direct estimation of happiness or misery". *(116) But Bowne believes that setting up the greatest happiness of all, as the end of action, does not solve our difficulties. Political reformers may use the thought to advantage, as they usually do, but the progress of ethical thought demands something more.

Conclusion on subjective ethics

We can allow that happiness is the aim of ethics, but that happiness must have a law that is universally binding. (117) Without that law, everything would be arbitrary. Without universality, everything would be in-

* "Data of Ethics", par. 21.

dividual caprice and whim. "The true ethical aim is to realize the common good; but the contents of this good have to be determined in accordance with an inborn ideal of human worth and dignity". (118) We are not abandoning the goods ethics, "for while happiness must have a law, the law must lead to happiness". (119) Whatever ethical system we adopt, the interpretation of its principles will have to be by some form of moral insight. (120) What is that moral quality that is called "insight"?

Moral insight The most common name for moral insight has been, and still is, "conscience". So many crimes have been committed in the name of conscience that the latter has suffered much damage as far as any claim to infallibility is concerned. There is no infallible guide to human conduct called conscience, but there is a recognition that a difference exists between right and wrong. We may differ as to what the right is, but the idea of right lies at the foundation of all morality. Combined with the recognition of a right, is the idea of obligation to that right. "Many attempts have been made to define and deduce this idea of moral obligation, but they all fail".(121) It is more than a simple emotion; it is more than a reflex of opinion; it is more than conformity to law. It is "the expression of a hypothetical necessity". (122) Yet it is more than that. The free spirit imposes the duty upon itself, which gives to the act moral quality.

One universal moral law

We have not yet gone beyond the formal law of obligation. In actual life, the one universal law binding upon us all is that of good will or love. "The law of love is the only strictly universal moral law for all normal social action". (123) The performance of that law made a code is a guide. There is general agreement as to what that code shall be, for the virtues of benevolence, justice, gratitude, good will are approved and their opposites are condemned. Yet moral insight and actual conduct may not be the same, for "being is deeper than doing". (124)

Causality

In explaining causality Bowne says that we must think of causation as dynamic determination. But effects come from causes only by including them in the notion of being. Now morality is an effect. Man is moral; he has a moral nature. Therefore in the original cause there must have been provision for and encouragement of the moral nature now found in man. This gives to morality a cosmic significance and places ethics upon firmer ground than that of industrial caprice. If only one man was moral, the argument would lose much of its weight. In the universality of the essential ethical principles does the moral argument gain in strength. When we add to the argument of universality the arguments of experience and of value, the cosmic demands for righteousness is found to be reasonable.

The importance of "will to do right"

Man has not been, and is not yet, a perfect moral being. He has developed and is able to develop further. He is working toward an ideal and the most important factor in that ideal is the will to do right. "Where this is present, the most important element in moral development is given". (125) Our code of conduct is subject to change, but the good will must abide. Moral progress can be made only by the good will informed with high ideals and guided by the critical reason. We might call Bowne's ethical system a rationalistic intuitionalism.

Summary of second section of thesis

The beginning of ethics does not determine the validity of its principles. Ethics is built on experience and the values which arise from a study of the inner laws of consciousness. The following summary of ethics may be made at this point:

(1) Bowne believes that the intuitive and experience schools of ethics should be united.

(2) In the combination of duty ethics and goods ethics Bowne agrees with Kant that duty ethics must be supreme, although the demands of material rightness is recognized.

(3) The one universal law binding on all is that of good will or love.

(4) Ethics and metaphysics are interrelated in the categories of unity, causality, freedome, and purpose.

PART III

RELIGION

ETHICS AND METAPHYSICS MEET IN RELIGION
Origin of religion

It is natural to strive for unity and coherence in our world-view. Intelligence will carry us far in the attempt to explain life and the cosmos. But beyond our mightiest strivings, the dim mysteries of creation and ultimate destiny vanish into the misty portals of the unknown. Our religious consciousness brings into being the feelings of awe, wonder, mystery, and dependence. Three questions we may consider are the source of religion, the history of religion, and the rational foundation of religion.

We do not now look upon religion as the product of priestcraft or statecraft. The source of religion is in the mind itself. Through the ages, we have been exchanging low and inadequate conceptions of religion for higher and fuller ones. Religion has progressed as science has.

Experience shows that man was religious before he became a philosopher. Thus we cannot say that religion is the result of reflection. Man has often been more religious without speculation than with it. It is not very helpful to call religion a product of a "religious faculty". Any "religious faculty" comes from the attempt to explain re-

ligion, rather than religion coming from a "religious Faculty". It is hopeless to look for the source of religious ideas in external experience alone. We must assume that religion is founded in human nature as one of its essential needs and constitutional tendencies". (126)

The history of religion has some significance for us. "In one sense only does the history of religion have any bearing on the question of its truth. When we study the entire religious movement of humanity, noting not only the crude forms in which it began, but also the higher forms to which it grew, we may get a deeper sense of the universality and ineradicability of the religious element, and also a valuable hint of the direction in which its normal development lies. Such a historical fact would be a revelation of the nature of things, and would have the significance of any great cosmic manifestation and product". (127)

Rational basis of religion

Our major concern, however, is the rational foundation for the theistic idea which is the central and basal element of religion. We have religious ideas. Is there any warrant for them? "The theistic idea might be found to be absurd or contradictory. Or it might appear as an implication of the religious sentiment only, and without any significance for pure intellect. Or it might appear as a demand of our entire nature, intellectual, moral, aesthetic, and religious; so that

the true and the beautiful and the good alike, would find in it their root and spring". (128) In the last case, theism would seem to have the warrant of the entire self.

Function of the theistic idea

The function of the theistic idea may be two-fold. "Theism may be advanced as an hypothesis for the explanation of phenomena. As such it has no real function at all, but solely a logical and metaphysical one". (129) Intellectual and metaphysical considerations as to the nature of the absolute and the relative, the infinite and the finite, the necessary and the contingent, the self-moving, and the moved, cannot satisfy the religious consciousness of man. Again, "theism may be held as the implication and the satisfaction of our entire nature, intellectual, emotional, aesthetic, ethical, and religious. These elements reach out after God so naturally, and when developed, almost so necessarily, that they have always constituted the chief actual grounds of theistic belief. Accordingly the human mind has always adjusted its conception of God with reference less to external nature than to its own internal needs and aspirations". (130) It is in the latter type of functioning, that we find ethics and metaphysics contributing the elements that make up our idea of God.

Metaphysical attributes of world-ground

There could be no being that we could possibly call God that had not certain metaphysical attributes. While the metaphysical Being known as the world-ground may not elicit from us the emotion of worship, there could be no God for the ethicist without certain metaphysical presuppositions. There can be no Being worthy of worship without ethical content. Neither can there be any Being to worship without metaphysical principles or attributes.

The unity of the world-ground

The first of these principles is Unity. There must be a basal and a fundamental reality which is self-sufficient, absolute, independent. Since it is not limited by anything beyond itself, it is infinite. Any restrictions imposed upon God are self-limiting restrictions. Hence the relations God has with the world and man need not be restrictive. "Metaphysics shows that ontological unity is possible only on the personal plane, and that no regressive thought according to tje law of the sufficient reason will ever pass from plurality to unity". (131) If there be things and if there be interaction, pluralism does not solve the problems of reality. A basal monism does not solve all problems, but it is better than pluralism. The latter does not satisfy the desire of man's mind for an ultimate

unity. From monism it is possible to pass to theism. Polytheism is untenable; our theism must be monistic. So far the affirmation has been made that the nature of the infinite is one. Religion hopes to identify that One with God. "The unity of the world-ground means ..... not only that it is uncompounded, indivisible, and without distinction of parts, but also that there is but one such fundamental existence". (132)

The attribute of Unchangeability

Religion rather takes for granted many of the imperative categories of metaphysics. The principle of "identity and change" is called in theology "unchangeability". This means the unchangeability of God is "the constancy and continuity of the divine nature which exists through all the divine acts as their law and source. Metaphysics further shows that if we insist upon having some abiding and identical principle superior to change and constant in change, it can be found only in personality". (133) Many things are gathered up in this attribute. Religious thought, as distinct from theological thought, has meant something distinct from the metaphysical formula, One aim has been to affirm the independence and eternity of God in opposition to the dependence and brevity of man. "Again, the predicate has often been made to mean the ethical constancy of the divine activity, and to exclude all arbitrariness and caprice fromthe divine purposes. In this last sense the attribute passes

from the metaphysical into the ethical realm, and eludes any metaphysical deduction or justification". (134) Unchangeability escapes the vagaries of an eternal flow by being a quality of a self-conscious spirit, in which there can be a union of personality traits. Only through an underlying "idea" that is intelligent and active can there be abiding reality. Ethics and metaphysics unite in producing the attribute of unchangeability.

The attribute of Omnipresence

The attribute of omnipresence concerns God's relation to space. Nothing that exists in space can be a unit. Thus omnipresence means a denial of the limitations which beset us. "Omnipresence is real only as the entire mind is present in each and every point; as the entire mind is present in each and (sic) all its thoughts". (133) Immediate action means presence, and immediate action which extends to all things, is omnipresence. When we accept the ideality of space, God, or the world-ground can be immanent or omnipresent in all things. Space must be only phenomenal or omnipresence is impossible The importance of omnipresence for religion is apparent. Prayer especially is made more rational when God is everywhere active and complete. Communion with the Unseen can be very real when we know it is not necessary mentally to wander off into space to find God.

The attribute of ~~to~~ Eternity

Another metaphysical notion carried into religion is that of eternity. This attribute concerns God's relation to time. From metaphysics we learn that time is no form of existence but that it is only a form of experience. We have often experienced the surprising diversity in time-spans. Some days seem short; other days, long. While there are so many minutes, mechanically, to an hour, time is really a matter of experience. The full, happy, joyous life is short and sweet. The unhappy, anxious life is much longer. * If time is a matter of experience, a thought relation, then it is phenomenal. "There is a large element of relativity in our temporal judgments which may not be transferred to God, being valid only for ourselves". (136) A being in full possession of itself, forever what it will to be, is not in time. It has a changeless knowledge and a changeless life. For such a being the present only exists. In the relationship of God to our temporal world, it is necessary to fall back upon "transcendental empiricism, and interpret our terms by the living experience of intelligence. The self-identity of self-equality of intelligence is the only real changelessness of which we have experience..... All else is abstract fiction". (138)

* The writer's.

The attribute of Omniscience

"Absolute personality must be absolute self-knowledge and self-control". (139) There is only one way out of our difficulty of positing freedom in us and omniscience in God. We must allow the possibility of God having modes of knowing which are unknown to us. It is not proved that a foreknowledge of freedom is a contradiction and yet we cannot conceive such a possibility. This traditional problem vanishes, however, with the acceptance of the ideality and relativity of time.

The attribute of Omnipotence

For God to be omnipotent the world-ground must be conceived as agent, not substance, and as cause rather than "stuff". The heart of an ethical being is his will. If God has no will, then he is not ethical. He may be a great, powerful, necessitarian law, but he is not a person. Without the power to choose there can be no worthy personality. "At every point the absolute will must be present to give validity and reality to the otherwise powerless necessities of the divine being. In this sense we may say, with Spinoza, that God is the cause of himself. He incessantly constitutes himself the rational and absolute spirit. God is absolute will or absolute agent, forever determining himself according to rational and eternal principles". (140) That abso-

luteness of will is abstract for the metaphysician, but for the religionist it becomes synonymous with the Good, Duty, and virtue. The leap is one of faith, but not a wholly irrational one. Choosing the best elements from life and experience, the religiously minded build a conception of God which should be the image of the best that we know.

Ethical attributes of the world-ground

We have explained somewhat the connection which metaphysics has with religion. The mind rebels at a purely metaphysical conception of God. It demands a religious conception adequate to human needs. That is why some people would rather worship the man Jesus than the God Jesus tried to reveal. * In our study so far we have not reached the God of religion. Much remains to be done before we can attribute ethical qualities to the world-ground.

The question is settled at once if we accept the mental ideal of a perfect being as the ground of the universe. A perfect whole would inculcate within itself the moral attributes of the Good, Duty, and Virtue.

* The writer's.

"There is no way of speculative deduction; for the metaphysical attributes, as we have said, are ethically barren. We must, then, either have immediate faith in our ideal of the perfect being or else appeal to experience to prove that the world-ground proceeds according to ethical principles. Our actual procedure is a mixture of both". (141)

"The empirical argument for the moral character of the world-ground is derived from our moral nature, the structure of society, and the course of history. The two first are held to point to a moral author, and the last reveals a power not ourselves, making for righteousness, and hence moral". (142) It is taken for granted that where there is a moral nature, there is a moral author. The assumption is a spontaneous one. There is no known way of deducing the moral from the non-moral, except by begging the question. "Spontaneous thought has generally regarded the moral nature in man as pointing to a moral character in God as its only sufficient ground". (143) Man is a part of the unity we attempt to make of all reality. His nature is the microcosm which reveals the nature of the macrocosm. *

* The writer's, with apologies to Professor Earl Marlatt.

Then we have the structure of life and of society, and the course of history, pointing to moral ideas and a moral aim. Nature places a strong approval upon "the virtues of industry, prudence, foresight, self-control, honesty, truth, and helpfulness". (144) The way of virtue tends to life abundant, while the way of sin tends to sorrow and death. Nature seems to be on the side of righteousness. The objection may now easily be raised that such a view is partial. Nature also is cruel, impersonal, and unmindful of man. But such a statement is also partial. Nature is both cruel and good, harmful and helpful, ugly and beautiful. We pick out what we desire to call good and place that above us as the ideal toward which the world is moving. That ideal takes upon itself the personality and purpose we call by the name of God. It does not seem that society in the long run is an institution organized for moral ends. "Out of the clash of selfish interests a moral system emerges". (145) We can easily find illustrations for our faith, but no demonstration that is satisfactory. The deepest facts, however, do not come to us as the result of syllogisms, but from the experience of life. "Life is deeper than logic".

God and purpose

That there is purpose in the world seems evident to the unbiased observer. In the "Theory of Thought and Knowledge", purpose is listed as a

category. Bowne's metaphysics clearly implies purpose as an immanent mental principle. "Intelligence and reason are such only as they are guided by ends; and a guidance by ends emans nothing except as those ends are present in consciousness as ideal aims". (146) "The notion of a world-government acquires rational meaning only as some supreme good exists which is to be the outcome of creation, and which, therefore, gives the law for all personal activity. A world-government implies a world-goal which in turn, implies a world-law". (147) That moral values are able to develop shows, at least, that the world-ground is not unfriendly, to morality. When an environment is helpful, and when that environment sees beyond mere helpfulness to imperative necessity we are justified in assuming that we are part of a system which is adjusted to and supplements our efforts. It is then that metaphysics and ethics fuse their attributes into an all-embracing Purpose. The only sufficient world-goal is found in the world of value and morals. Morality as the purpose of the Creator implies morality in the Creator, an element we have not heretofore assigned to the world-ground.

Ethics and Causality

God has been posited as the metaphysical cause behind all activity. He is the mind which explains all phenomena as ontological

reality. If that is true, then "there is no getting out of a cause something that was not at least implicitly in it". (148) If matter is made to explain everything, we must define matter so as to include all of life with its moral demands. When the moral law becomes the expression of a Holy Will, it no longer is an impersonal abstraction.

Ethics and Freedom

In the world-ground there is no mechanical necessity implied in the notion of law. The world is administered by freedom for the attainment of rational ends. No metaphysical necessity is possible in an intelligent universe where freedom is necessary for rational unity, completeness, and systematic connection. Rationality stands or falls with the belief in a free and intelligent ground of things. While the freedom of man is limited, the freedom of God is limited only by the demands of his own nature. Freedom is the power of self-control and self-direction in an intelligent being. It is the power to form plans, purposes, ideals and to work for their realization. It is the power to choose between competing or conflicting possibilities and to realize the one chosen. Conscious agents arethe only ones who can act and choose and thus be moral beings.

Freedom and error

We know that there are errors in our world. There is error in thought and error in act. The only solution to the problem of error is freedom. Reason cannot be trusted unless freedom is allowed to explain error. We need to have freedom to enable us to distinguish between the truth and error and to enable us to determine the standard for our thinking. Religion is interested in this phase of thought because the moral nature is stressed as the basis of authority rather than an external code. Freedom allows us to violate the code without destroying its authority. Any necessitarian system is disastrous to morality and intelligence. The only system of thought which is consistent with morals and ideal is theism. There is no reason why a free spirit cannot be created by a free God. It is in the free spirit imposing duties upon itself that morality arises. The center of character is the will to do right.

ETHICS AND PANTHEISM

The most dangerous foes to personalism are positivism and pantheism. Pantheism is more dangerous because it is almost within the scope of the divine immanence doctrine. Bowne has sufficiently discounted positivism by his emphasis upon intelligence and con-

sciousness in the world-ground. Where there is freedom in ultimate reality, there can be no mechanical necessity and hence no sympathy with positivism. Pantheism is the real rival of theism. By the former the world is made either a part of God or a necessary part of the divine nature. Theism holds that the world is a free act and creation of God. The finite, if it be more than phenomenal, must be viewed as produced by God, not from God. It is necessary to drop all quantitative and spatial conceptions in order to view God as entire in every mode, and the modes as forms of his activity. "The existence of the world in God means simply its continuous dependence on him". (149) ".....True substantial existence, in distinction from phenomenal existence, can be predicated only of persons". "Identity, unity, causality, substantiality are possible only under the personal form. On all these accounts the impersonal can only be viewed as dependent phenomenon, or process of an energy not its own". (150) With pantheism there is complete determinism in God and in man. The latter becomes part of the impersonal whole. There is no room for freedom, and hence none for purpose. No distinction can be made between good and evil. Sin and error become a part of God. Thus the

metaphysical conception of freedom in the world-ground is very essential for ethics and for religion.

Pantheism, theism, and creation.

Theism does not teach that "nothing caused something", but rather that God caused a new existence to begin, and in such a way that he was no less after the creation than he was before. God did not make the world from nothing as a raw material, nor from himself. He caused that to be which apart from his activity had no existence. Creation reconciles the unity of God with the existence of the finite. Pantheism, in making the world a part of God under the category of quantity, is untenable. Hence pantheism is rejected on both rational and ethical grounds.

Pantheism, immanence, and transcendence

An unethical God is not an object worthy of worship. If evil and error find their way into the God-head, worship is not apt to be true worship. Bowne adds the idea of transcendence to the doctrine of the divine immanence. God is the Eternal Presence, but he is also the Transcendent Ruler. There is no moral significance in his immanence. "It is simply the dependence of all finite things

on God, and involves no spiritual likeness or nearness. We may all live and move and have our being in God, without any spiritual sympathy". (151) Metaphysical immanence does not imply moral and spiritual character. Moral sympathy and character cannot be reached by speculation. The ethical qualities which we add to the nature of God are from the interpretation of our own moral experience. They represent the demands of the entire man for rationality, morality, and unity in the Almighty Architect.

The need of religion

All the diverse elements of our nature work together to construct a religious ideal. The intellect has its ideal; the conscience brings its perfect conception; and the affections bring their ideal. Into one Perfect Whole, all these ideals are moulded. Many are the gates that lead to God. To some extent the real universe recognizes the ideals. Reality does have rationality, goodness, and beauty in varying degrees. Faith is needed to make the assumption that the glimmers of moral truth revealed to us are the products of a beneficent creator. "The mind is not driven by any compulsion of objective facts, but rather by the subjective necessity of self-

realization and self-preservation". (152) Our thinking rests upon a teleological foundation. We find in our universe those things which our nature demands. "One great source and spring of theological progress has been the need of finding a conception of God which the moral nature could accept". (153) There is a perpetual necessity of recasting theology in the light of higher moral truths. "Thus science, ethics, and religion grow; and the mind, in its increasing sense of self-possession and of harmony with the reality of things, becomes more and more indifferent to the objections of the skeptic, and works with ever growing faith to build up the temple of science, of conscience, and of God". (154) "....The force of the ethical demand for an ethical Creator can never be felt from mere reflection upon psychological abstractions, but only from living participation in the moral effort and struggle of humanity". (155) Activity in the moral realm is as essential for us as activity in the metaphysical realm is for God.

Theism and Christianity

It is difficult to find a warm, compelling religion in the abstractions of metaphysics. We must clothe the skeleton we have produced with our own faith. That is an individual matter which depends upon the nature of the person involved. No one can prescribe my religious faith for me. I am free to

reject doctrines if they do not coincide with the moral character of God as I have conceived it. On the other hand, I must accept those conclusions which history and reason stamp as truth, or be untrue to the facts. We add to the bare facts of the intellect the warm intuitions of the affections as we construct the nature of the Divine Being. * "The speculative intellect necessarily stops short of the religious idea of God, but it gives us some fundamental elements of the conception". (156) Our aesthetic and ethical nature demands a God with ethical attributes. Theism is the sum and source of all our ideals. "The cognitive ideal of the universe, as a manifestation of the Supreme Person, leads to theism. The moral ideal of the universe, as a manifestation of the Supreme Righteousness, leads to theism. The practical ideal of a "far-off divine event to which the whole creation moves" leads to theism. (157)

Christian theism is adequate for our moral inspiration because of three things. (1) By affirming a free Creator and free creatures it gives moral government a meaning. (2) By making the moral nature of man the manifestation of an omnipotent and eternal righteousness which underlies the cosmos, it sets our moral convictions above all doubt and overthrow. (3) It provides a

* The writer's.

conception of man and his destiny that gives man a worthy task and an inalienable sacredness. We may be true to the highest and the best in us, confident that it will not lead us astray. The contention is not that God exists as the product of a syllogism, but that theistic faith is an implication of the moral and the practical life, without which, thought and morality are in hopeless confusion. To Borden Parker Bowne, a name I speak with the utmost respect, experience meant self as well as sense, feelings as well as facts, love as well as logic. In this composite experience, the moral and religious values were the deepest and most fundamental realities. *

IN CONCLUSION One of the main distinctions in my thesis is the difference between phenomenal and ontological reality. Space, time, and matter are all phenomenal. Only selves, souls, and mind have ontological reality. By that I mean that ultimate reality is mind rather than matter. The essential metaphysical categories are being, the "nature of things" or things as laws of activity, change and identity, causality, the world-ground, space, time, activity, unity, and freedom. Experience is the ground upon which the categories are built.

* The writer's.

The latter do not explain the mind, but the mind construes the categories. Ultimate reality is a unified, active, causal, volitional, intelligent, personal force. Both the finite and the infinite have "freedom".

The metaphysical categories are ethically barren, but a guide to life is found in ethics. The source of ethics is the inner consciousness and the field of life. Both metaphysics and ethics build on experience. For the most part, the ethics of Bowne is dependent on his metaphysics. But we need the help of moral experience to make a working system of ethics. In the use of the metaphysical categories, ethics is shown to depend largely on metaphysics for its unity and coherence, if not for its validity. Bowne conciliates the goods ethics and the duty ethics. In the long run, unless results are good the action can not be ethical. Bowne accepts Schleiermacher's position that the good, duty, and virtue are the fundamental moral ideas. Formal rightness is more important than material rightness. Bowne is Kantian in his emphasis upon formal ethics.

The good will is important but it needs a field for its development. This environment is not the product of the self; it is given to us. The world-ground is not un-

friendly to morality but seems to demand morality from all. Bowne's ethical system is a rationalistic intuitionalism.

Ethic's and metaphysics meet in religion. The history of religion and of life, the structure of society, and the nature of man show the universal appeal of religion. Religion is demanded by the rational, the aesthetic, and the moral nature of man. While the metaphysical attributes of the world-ground are barren of ethics, we clothe the bare attributes of metaphysics with the living necessities of our practical nature. The metaphysical God is adequate for religion. Morality demands a moral God. The world-ground must be defined so as to include man's moral nature. When that is done, the world-ground becomes moral. If it is not done, we are not true to the facts of experience. Morality cannot come from non-morality,

The nature of God cannot be demonstrated. What we decide is the nature of the world-ground shows what our own character is as much as anything else. If we choose the best and call the result "God" we are true to the highest in life. Experience is a safe criterion when balanced by coherence. The experience of the moral nature demands a moral God. When the rational nature and the

aesthetic nature also demand a moral God, judgment is confirmed.

The only adequate world-view for metaphysics, ethics, and religion is that of theism. Pantheism founders on the fact of error. Only in freedom can we reconcile God and error and the reconciliation is not wholly satisfactory. We are free spirits, nevertheless, created by a free God. Transcendence brings the immanent God above the limitations of the world and pantheism.

The ethics of Bowne is for the most part dependent on his metaphysics. This dependence appears in the attempt to formulate an harmonious intellectual system. Especially important are the following interrelations:

(1) Ethics and causality; (2) ethics and unity; (3) ethics and freedom; (4) ethics and purpose.

Since experience is the basic elements in Bowne's systems of metaphysics and of ethics a close relation appears at this point also. But beyond our immediate experience extends the larger realm of faith. Beyond our immediate experience extends the larger realm of faith. Beyond

our certainties are the mysteries. Both metaphysics and ethics depend upon religion for their consummating agreements. Not that religion is outside our experience. On the contrary, religion can be the sum of all our aspirations dedicated to the all-inclusive purpose of doing God's will. "Religion is the p ssion for righteous ness and the spread of righteousness conceived as a cosmic demand". (Lecture 4, Hist. and Phil. of Rel., Prof. Hocking, Harvard, 1930). Here we see why ethics must end in religion. If there is a cosmic demand for righteousness, I am bound to heed that call as the voice of God. On the other hand, the attempt to arrive at the attributes of the world-ground must likewise end in religion. Bowne comes finally to the conclusion that the world-ground is personal and purposive. In that conclusion he reaches theism. Without metaphysics ethics is isolated and unauthoritative. Without ethics metaphysics is unrelated to life and hence incomplete as an explanation of reality. Stopping short of religion, both ethics and metaphysics stop short of ultimate reality. It is in religious faith, unproved by logic, but confirmed by intuition, that we reach the knowledge of the Whole.

The best name for Bowne's system as a whole is "personalism". He was a "pragmatic personalist"

although he went beyond pragmatism to coherence. It is natural for a man to develop as he matures. Bowne's development is from "Objective Idealism" to "Transcendental Empiricism". The shift is from logic to experience. Bowne's system is a pragmatic idealism from the ethical standpoint, and a pragmatic, idealistic transcendentalism from the metaphysical view. Both systems are united in his religion. *

* This paragraph is the writer's.

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